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According to efficient markets theory, the stock price on a competitive market is the 
best estimate of the stock’s present value. This is the basic assumption for predictions using 
experimental markets. The first part of the paper describes the features of such an 
experimental market, discusses shortly its advantages in providing predictions as compared to 
traditional opinion polls and identifies some assumptions that can influence its efficiency and 
predictive accuracy. The second part of the paper is then devoted to the results of the first 
experimental market organized in the Czech Republic, the political stock market on the Czech 
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  31. Introduction 
 
According to efficient markets theory, prices in stock markets reflect all available information 
and are the best estimates of the present value of traded assets.
1 The same hypothesis 
underlies experimental stock markets. In this paper we describe the first experimental stock 
market organized in the Czech Republic, the political stock market on Czech Parliamentary 
Elections into the Chamber of Deputies in June 2002 and discuss how the market could be 
used to forecast the election outcome. We also discuss the accuracy of the market forecast and 
possibilities to transfer the method to forecasting other genuine economic events like future 
inflation. 
During the last ten years a rising interest in using experimental markets to predict electoral 
outcomes could be observed. The pioneers of political stock market research Forsythe et al. 
(1995, 1999) designed and implemented the Iowa Presidential Stock Market (IPSM, later as 
Iowa Electronic Markets or IEM) in 1988 to yield predictions of the expected vote shares of 
Presidential candidates in that fall’s election. Inspired by the predictive success of the pioneer 
market a large number of political markets was further conducted in the U.S. and Europe, for 
example in Germany (Beckmann and Werding 1996, Brüggelambert 1997, Berlemann 2000), 
Austria (Ortner et al. 1995), the Netherlands (Jacobsen et al. 2000) or Sweden (Bohm and 
Sonnegard 1999).
2 
The purpose of our research was to introduce the political stock market method in the Czech 
Republic and to yield predictions of the expected vote shares of the political parties in the 
parliamentary election into the Chamber of Deputies in 2002. The “2002 Czech Election 
Market” was conducted over Internet using the market platform of Dresden Electronic 
Markets (DEM) at Dresden University of Technology. The participants of the market were 
students and teachers at the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague. 
Because a number of traders were students of economics (often in specialization capital 
markets) and the market features (the way the trade exchange is organized) were not so 
different from the ones of the real stock markets, the project had also educational purposes. 
Third aim, and a “by-product” of the project, was to create a list of potential participants of 
further experimental markets planned in the Czech Republic. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the prototype experimental stock 
market and discuss some basic trading strategies, compare advantages and disadvantages of 
the predictions made via experimental markets and via traditional polls, and we list some 
suggestions for raising efficiency of the experimental markets. In Section 3 we describe the 
results of the „2002 Czech Election Market“ and compare the prediction of this market with 
the predictions made by traditional political opinion research. In the final section we conclude 
and broadly outline our plans for further research in this field. 
 
2. Experimental Political Stock Markets 
2.1 Market Description 
Political stock markets are typically fully computerized real-money futures markets operated 
over the Internet. Registered participants invest their own money, buy and sell contracts with 
the motivation to make profits and they bear the risk of losing as well as earning money. A 
by-product of the market is a prediction of the results of some political event, typically an 
election outcome. 
                                                           
1 See Sunder (1995, p. 446) or Fosythe et al. (1992, p. 1142). 
2 A comprehensive survey of political stock markets conducted in Europe and an assessment of their 
predictive accuracy can be found in Berlemann and Schmidt (2001). 
  4The organizer of a political stock market issues contracts which are then traded among the 
participants. Every contract represents a promise to pay a liquidation value (after the election, 
of course) based upon the fraction of the popular vote received by the political party on which 
the contract was issued.
3 Typically, contracts are issued on each major political party. In 
addition a contract for all parties not explicitly listed is issued, which is called „Rest of Field“ 
(mainly a bundle of minor parties with small expected vote shares).  
If, for example, Party A won 20 percent of the votes, Party A contracts will be liquidated at 
0.20 times the price of a unit portfolio as sold by the market organizer (for example 1 CZK). 
With the liquidation values determined this way, a unit portfolio (also called “bundle”) 
consisting of one contract for each party (including the „Rest of Field“ contract) is always 
liquidated for the price of 1 CZK in the end of the market because vote shares are always 
summing up to 100 percent. At the same time, if markets are efficient, the current price at 
which any particular contract is traded is a prediction on the fraction of votes traders expect to 
be won by the party on which the contract was issued. 
In order to be allowed to take part in a political stock market and trade contracts, participants 
have to register via Internet, first. By registration some basic personal data and the decision 
about initial investment is required.
4 After supplying the initial investment (typically via cash 
or bank transfer to market account) the traders get a trader-ID and a password to login the 
market. In addition, a cash account for each trader is created and the initial investment is 
transferred to the account.
5 From this account a trader can draw funds to buy contracts. 
Purchases of contracts will result in transfers of contracts to the trader’s portfolio and the 
deduction of money from the cash account. Analogously, sales of contracts will result in 
transfers of contracts from trader’s portfolio to that of the buyer and crediting of the trader’s 
cash account.  
The traders can access the market via Internet. There is no fee for trading. Trading in the 
market is completely anonymous, but the program keeps track of every trader’s portfolio, cash 
balances, outstanding offers to buy and sell contracts and all past transactions. This 
information can be accessed only by the organizer of the market who at the same time is 
therefore not allowed to trade in the market.  
Contracts are placed into circulation when traders purchase unit portfolios from the market 
organizer for a set price of W, typically 1 CZK. Each unit portfolio consists of one of each 
type of contract. As already mentioned, any such unit bundle is liquidated again by 1 CZK at 
the end of the market. Thus, a 1 CZK investment in a unit portfolio held to liquidation will 
yield a payoff of 1 CZK to the trader. The organizer of the market stands ready not only to 
sell unit portfolios but as well to repurchase them for the price of 1 CZK each at any time 
during the market period. Buying and selling portfolios from or to the market organizer are 
primary market transactions and they bear no risk, but no gains for the trader as well. The 
investment/payoff rule just described guarantees that the market is a zero-sum game for the 
market organizer. All funds invested by traders are returned to them and gains by one trader 
are exactly offset by losses of other traders. However, the individual participant can win or 
loose money, depending on his or her success in trading within the secondary market (with 
                                                           
3 Another possibility is the contract on the fraction of seats won by the political party in parliament, see 
Forsythe et al. (1999, p. 85). 
4 The investments are typically somewhat restricted due to legislative restrictions in order to provide a 
clear signal about the academic research character of the market, see Berlemann (2002, p. 14) or Forsythe et al. 
(1999, p. 86).  
5 It is allowed to raise own funds by transferring further money to the own cash account (eventually up to 
the upper limit if it exists), but it is not allowed to withdraw money from the cash account before closure of the 
market.  
  5other traders, described hereafter). Thus, taking part in political stock markets is typically no 
zero-sum game for traders. 
The described method of issuing and liquidation of contracts has some further advantages. If, 
for example, the probability of success in the election of a certain political party (let’s say 
party X) meanwhile included in the „Rest of Field“ contract  rises considerably, the organizer 
of the market can simply split the Rest of Field contract into two new contracts – a party X 
contract and a new Rest of Field contract. Every participant who holds Rest of Field contracts 
in his portfolio is then endowed with the same number of the two new contracts. The method 
of splitting contracts can be applied for other purposes as well, for example in the case of a 
split of a political party into two successors. Analogously, parties with expectations of 
diminishing vote shares can be ad hoc added into the Rest of Field contract or simply merged. 
The issuing and liquidation method is therefore independent of the current political situation 
and could be applied anywhere and almost by any political change occurring during the 
market period. The decision about splitting or merging is then made by the organizer of the 
market who acts with the aim of raising the market’s efficiency.  
After buying some number of unit portfolios from the organizer, the trader can unbundle the 
contracts immediately and trade them individually within the secondary market, i.e. buy or 
sell contracts from or to other traders, in order to realize profits. The secondary market is 
usually organized as a so-called „continuous double-auction-market“. Traders can thus issue 
offers to buy (bids) or offers to sell (asks) contracts.  
The first type of transactions traders can use in the secondary market is called „limit orders“. 
By using limit offers a trader has to specify  
(a) the order type (bid or ask),  
(b) the contract type (for example „party A contract“),  
(c) the number of contracts he wants to trade,  
(d) the transaction price (typically a „limit price“; by bids the highest price, by asks the 
lowest price the trader is willing to accept) and  
(e) the expiration date of the order.  
The order can for example correspond with following oral expression: „I would like to buy 10 
party A contracts for the price of 0.23 CZK or lower and my offer lasts till February, 5
th“ 
(because, for example, I expect that the party A will win more than 23 percent of the votes). 
Limit offers are then maintained in bid and asks queues, ordered first by offer price and then 
by time of issuance. When an offer enters the bid or ask queue, it remains there until one of 
the following events occurs: 
(a)  it is withdrawn by the trader who issued it, 
(b) it reaches the top of the bid queue (or bottom of the ask queue) and is subsequently 
matched with an opposing offer, or 
(c)  it reaches its expiration date. 
Short sales and purchases are disallowed by the system. In order to be able to issue a bid the 
trader must have sufficient funds on his market cash account. Similarly, to issue an ask the 
trader must have the supplied contract in his portfolio. Checks for feasibility of offers are 
made immediately after entering the offer.  
The system carries out orders whenever bid-prices and ask-prices overlap. The principles for 
the execution of trades are as follows: (a) offers to buy are processed „high-prices first“; (b) 
offers to sell are processed „low-prices first“; (c) in the case of ties (two offers at the same 
price), the earliest offer to arrive on the market is processed first; and (d) when bid and ask 
prices overlap the trade is executed at the price of the older of these two offers.  
  6Thus, when a new feasible offer to buy is entered with a price equal to or exceeding the 
current minimum price in the ask queue, the trade is immediately carried out at the (older) ask 
price. Analogously, a newly entered ask with a price equal to or less than the current 
maximum price in the bid queue is executed at the (again older) bid price. Other offers with 
bid prices less than the current minimum price in the ask queue and ask prices exceeding the 
current maximum price in the bid queue are placed in the respective queues. If a feasible limit 
offer can be executed only in part, the trade is then carried out to the possible extent and the 
rest is further maintained in the respective queue.  
Traders are provided with a considerable amount of real time information. They have access 
to all their own private account information: which contracts they hold in their portfolios, 
what their cash balances are, outstanding bid and ask orders and which transactions they have 
completed. Every trader has further access to market information which includes  
(a) the current maximum bid price with the number of contracts demanded at that price,  
(b) the current minimum ask price with the number of contracts supplied at that price,
6 
(c) last transaction prices and 
(d) a summary of past trading activity (development of the transaction prices from 
beginning of the market, volumes of contracts traded on each day). 
In addition, as a combination of private and public information, the market software is 
computing an estimate of the trader’s portfolio value based on the last transaction prices. 
The second type of transactions traders can use is called „market orders“. In comparison with 
limit offers a trader chooses here only order type, contract type and volume. The trade is then 
executed immediately at current prices (current maximum bid price for market orders to sell 
and current minimum ask price for market orders to buy). If the number of contracts specified 
in the market order exceeds the amount available at the current price, the trade is executed 
only to the possible extent and the rest of the order is cancelled. 
Before we turn to strategies traders can use within the market it is worth asking why people 
trade at all in political stock markets. The zero-sum nature of the game is the main argument 
against participation: when a potential trader considers his chances to make profits in such a 
market he knows that on average the expected profit is zero. However, this is true only if all 
traders had the same information. In reality we observe people participating in political stock 
markets. Forsythe et al. (1992, p.  1145) lists the following five reasonable motives for 
participation: 
(a) a novelty factor (a trader treats participation in the political market like a substitute to 
other leisure-time activities of that kind, such as playing computer games, surfing 
Internet etc.), 
(b) a confidence factor with regards to information (a trader believes that he has better 
knowledge about the election and its likely outcome relative to the knowledge of other 
traders; this difference in information means that the trader treats the market for 
himself as a non-zero-sum game), 
(c) a confidence factor with regards to interpretation ability (the trader believes his ability 
to interpret news and their impact on the election outcome is better relative to other 
traders), 
(d) a confidence factor with regards to talent as a trader, 
                                                           
6 In some markets the information about the amount demanded (supplied) at the maximum bid (minimum 
ask) price is not available so the trader can be only sure to be able to buy or sell at least one contract at actual 
price, see Berlemann (2002, p. 18) 
  7(e) risk-seeking behavior. 
2.2 Basic trading strategies 
The trader can choose from a variety of strategies in order to yield profits. According to 
Berlemann (2002, p. 18), we might think of the following four types of possible strategies that 
can be of course combined in several ways: 
(a) arbitrage strategy, 
(b) expectation strategy, 
(c) risk-adjusted expectation strategy and 
(d) speculative strategy. 
When choosing arbitrage strategy, the trader focuses on realizing risk-free profits. Arbitrage 
operations are possible if the sum of all actual bids to buy is above the price of unit portfolio 
(typically 1 CZK) or if the sum of all actual asks to sell is below the price of unit portfolio. In 
the former case a trader can buy a unit portfolio from the market organizer and sell it 
immediately at current prices within the market. Analogously, in the latter case a trader can 
buy a unit bundle at current prices within the market and sell it on the primary market for 1 
CZK. This strategy to gain profit is of course possible only if none of the current bids or asks 
was issued by the trader considering an arbitrage operation. Berlemann (2002, p. 18) 
discusses the risk-free nature of this strategy and comes to the result that “the described 
arbitrage strategy is not totally risk-free because of the risk that during the arbitrage 
transactions someone may withdraw his order”. There is as well a possibility that some trader 
is faster and executes the risk-free arbitrage operation earlier. These risks are greater when 
trading in web-based markets as opposed to telnet markets because actual information could 
be gained only by reloading the web site. But if we take into account that arbitrage 
transactions take only few seconds the risks are very small and can be neglected.  
The expectation strategy requires that traders built some expectation on the election outcome 
and then buy only those contracts which are in their opinions undervalued by the market and 
sell those contracts which are overvalued. This strategy is of course not risk-free anymore and 
its success is based on the quality and accuracy of the traders’ expectation. 
The risk-adjusted expectations strategy is some kind of variation of the simple expectations 
strategy. It assumes a trader to know that his or her expectation on the election outcome could 
be wrong or simply imperfect. Such a trader will also buy in his opinion undervalued 
contracts and sell overvalued contracts; but in comparison with a trader following the simple 
expectations strategy he will more carefully weigh up possible profits if his expectation turns 
out to be correct against possible loss if it is wrong. Ceteris paribus, if a trader following the 
risk-adjusted expectations strategy faces rising market price of some contract, he will sell the 
contract earlier than a trader with simple expectations strategy. 
The speculative strategy is based on a trader’s expectations of other traders’ behavior. Traders 
following this strategy are trying to make use of short- or middle-term trends of market prices. 
These traders will hold a contract even if they expect it to be overvalued as long as they 
expect prices will go on rising. If there are many traders following the speculative strategy it 
is possible that “speculative bubbles” arise and later burst, making the prediction power of 
experimental markets somewhat distorted. 
2.3 Political Stock Markets versus traditional polls: what predicts better? 
We have noted that if political stock markets are efficient, the current price at which any 
particular contract is trading is a prediction about the fraction of votes that traders expect to be 
won by the party on which the contract was issued. Because of the fact that markets close 
  8short before election, the set of last transaction prices in the market before closing is a 
prediction of the election outcome generated by political stock market.  
We should note that interim predictions based on transaction prices during the market 
existence may be biased because of possible speculative strategies practiced by some traders 
and possible resulting “price bubbles”. The near the closing date of the market, the less traders 
choose speculative strategy and the greater emphasis traders put on the expectation of the 
election outcome and not on the expectation of the other traders’ behavior. Thus, for 
comparisons of predictive accuracy with traditional polls we should use the last transaction 
prices.
7 
Traditional political opinion researches or surveys (polls) are based on asking questions to a 
selected sample of population (respondents) about their personal preferences for candidates or 
political parties. The prediction is then computed from the gained raw data using some 
correction procedure based on empirically observed biases.
8 The necessary conditions for 
predictive accuracy of polls are then (a) “representativeness” of the sample, (b) the quality 
(veracity) of the data and (c) the procedure used to correct the raw data. Thus, if the sample 
does not include some relevant part of population, or if respondents lie or the questions are 
not well stated, or if there is no appropriate correction method for possible biases, the forecast 
will not be accurate.
9 
On the other hand, political stock markets have some indisputable advantages with regards to 
the above mentioned conditions: firstly, there is no need for the sample to be representative. 
Forsythe et al. (1999, p. 87) stress that “the markets do not require that traders reveal anything 
at all about their personal preferences for candidates or parties through their trading”. The role 
of traders is to try to predict better than other traders how the election outcome will be. Thus, 
they only need to have good information about aggregate voting behavior. But different from 
polls, the forecast generated by political stock market is obtained by marginal behavior of 
traders via last trading prices (due to the market mechanism the highest bid price and the 
lowest ask price which overlapped), not by the average of the traders’ opinions (as for 
example by the average price of ask or bid queue).  
In order to get a good election forecast, there is thus no need that all traders be well informed 
about the probable election outcome. The necessary condition is only that at least a small part 
of traders is well informed, i.e. the information is available within the market. This is the so-
called “Hayek hypothesis”
10 which asserts that markets can work correctly even if the 
participants have very limited knowledge about their environment or about their participants. 
In the realm of experimental economics and political stock markets it means that “the 
efficiency of the market depends not on the average trader, but on what we call the “marginal 
trader”, a trader relatively free of judgment bias who consistently buys and sells at prices 
close to the equilibrium price” (Forsythe et al., 1992, p. 1143). Thus, political stock markets 
                                                           
7 But in reality there were no “price bubbles” documented in political stock markets, so the argument is 
more a theoretical one. It could be therefore argued that the speculative strategy is as well only a theoretical one 
and that traders are more practicing the expectations or arbitrage strategy. 
8 Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) or Berlemann (1999) mention for example so called “pressure of the 
climate of opinion” bias based on the tendency of people with preferences toward the political party which leads 
in the surveys to hide their true preferences. Another well known bias is the tendency of the supporter of extreme 
parties to cover their true preferences as well. 
9 For a well-founded discussion of the problems of traditional polls see Berlemann (1999) or Berlemann 
and Schmidt (2001). 
10 See one of Hayek’s most cited paper The Use of Knowledge in Society (Hayek, 1945). For the 
introduction of this thesis into the experimental economics see Smith (1982). 
  9serve as a test of this hypothesis as well and empirical results from experimental economics 
have so far supported this thesis.
11  
Secondly, political stock markets do not have to take care of systematic errors of traditional 
polls caused by methods of asking question, recording answers etc. Although there are some 
correction procedures applied by polls, there is no guarantee that the resulting forecast will be 
free of such errors. 
Thirdly, there is a difference between motivations of people who are subject to the 
measurement of political opinion in traditional polls and in political stock markets. Pollsters 
have to rely on the goodwill of the interviewed persons who at the same time have no 
motivation to reveal their true political preferences.
12 Additionally, there could be an 
incentive deficit or mistakes on the side of the pollsters as well. On the other hand, the traders 
in the political stock markets are highly motivated by the possibility of earning profits if they 
do the best from their information. As Berlemann and Schmidt (2001, p. 17) state, there is 
some kind of self-selection of the traders. Only those traders, who believe to have good 
information about the possible election outcome, take part in the market. Thus, non-informed 
traders have no incentive to enter the market and they do not influence the election forecast. 
There are some further advantages of political stock markets. If we neglect the possibility of 
speculative “price bubbles”, there is a prediction of election outcome at any time the market is 
running. Traditional polls are in contrast organized mostly on a weekly basis and there is 
moreover time needed to record, summarize and correct the data, which means that results 
from such surveys are somewhat outdated when published. We should mention as well that 
political stock markets are much cheaper to run than traditional polls.  
But there are some advantages of traditional polls as well. For example, we cannot get some 
data about political preferences of certain social groups and sub-samples via political stock 
markets. There is moreover the “existence” question, i.e. could the political stock markets 
exist if there were no traditional polls? We should therefore consider both methods of 
forecasting as complements rather than substitutes because the published polls results are 
doubtless one of the main information sources which traders in the political stock market 
use.
13  
Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) discuss the empirical evidence in Germany about predictive 
accuracy of political stock markets and traditional polls. They conclude that more than a half 
of the political stock markets conducted in Germany predicted better than traditional polls (on 
the 10% confidence level of statistical significance; for the testing methodology see part 3 of 
this paper). This could be a further argument for improving our predictions of political events 
by introducing political stock market method in addition to the traditional polls. 
2.4 Raising efficiency and predictive accuracy of political stock markets 
In order to get the best prediction of some political event, the political stock market must 
operate efficiently. As we have already mentioned, there is some evidence (at least in case of 
Germany) that some of the conducted markets performed well and some of them worse than 
                                                           
11 See Smith (1982) or Sunder (1995). Forsythe et al. (1992) or Forsythe et al. (1999) discuss the 
systematic judgment bias which they found among traders and its possible sources as wish fulfillment, false 
consensus effect etc. They argue that in spite of the existence of biases in average, the markets predict well 
because the prices are determined by marginal, best informed traders. 
12 Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) discuss the problems of the data quality. For example, interviewed 
people do not have to consider the questions carefully or they can cover their preferences even if they are 
financially rewarded when answering etc. 
13 Forsythe et al. (1992, p. 1153) oppositely argue that their data rejected the view that polls drive the 
market. Traders were thus able to find out about the mood of the electorate without relying on opinion polls. In 
our opinion this fact cannot exclude opinion polls as one of the information sources which traders make usually 
use of but states only that traders are not relying exclusively on published opinion survey results. 
  10polls. Could we identify any features that raise efficiency of the political stock market and 
thus its predictive power? 
First of all, there is usual praxis that initial investment of traders is subsidized. Because the 
market can be considered as zero-sum game, there can be a lack of interest in participation at 
such a market if potential traders in average expect zero profits. For the traders, there is a 
better alternative having their money in bank yielding interest. The subsidy is rather symbolic 
(about 10 percent of initial investment) and it serves as well for attracting interest of potential 
traders.  
Berg et al. (1997) conducted an empirical analysis of 16 U.S. election stock markets in order 
to find significant features and identified two broad groups of factors that could generally 
influence the efficiency of the market: 
(a) election properties that lie beyond the ability of market organizer to improve or 
change them (with small exceptions), and 
(b) market properties that could be deliberately improved by market designer. 
Among election properties belong level of election and number of candidates. They argue that 
the higher level of election, the more information is available to traders because of greater 
media coverage and higher interest among trader and people. At the same time the higher 
level of election, the higher chance that a trader himself will be one of the voters, thus having 
at least his own private information about how he will vote. Thus, more information is 
available within the market and makes the prediction more accurate.  
The number of candidates roughly corresponds to the number of contract types (with the 
exception of the contract “Rest of Field”). Increasing the number of political parties (and thus 
the number of contract types) increases the number of variables that the market must predict, 
making the prediction more difficult. The traders have to deal with more information bearing 
more costs of seeking for and analyzing them. This feature has been found very significant, 
recommending the inclusion of more relatively small parties into the contract “Rest of Field”. 
Market properties include trading volume, number of active traders, participant experience 
level and some queue information like spreads or differences in depth of queues, measuring 
imbalances and “movement” in prices. More trading volumes means that private information 
is revealed faster, thus increasing the amount of information within the market. This property 
is as well very significant in the study of Berg et al. (1997) which means that “active” markets 
with high volumes of trade predict better. The same could be said about the number of active 
traders, who not only bring more information into the market, but increasing the number of 
active traders increases competition among them as well, thus increasing the speed with 
which new information is incorporated in the market. 
If traders are experienced, the political stock markets operate more efficient, there are less 
“price bubbles” and traders simply make fewer mistakes as they gain experience. 
Additionally, more experienced traders may have been studying the election longer and they 
can bring more information to the market. 
Finally, there is an evidence that greater spreads and greater differences in depths of bid and 
ask queues indicate that the market is not yet in the equilibrium, that it has not yet absorbed 
all information and that the prices are still moving. The higher these variables shortly before 
the election are, the worse the predictive accuracy of the market is. 
There are some other features not mentioned by Berg et al. (1997) that influence the 
efficiency. The logic tells us that the more money traders invested in the market, the more 
they believe in their private information and ability to make profits, thus there is a great 
chance that a lot of information will be included in the market, making its efficiency higher.
14 
                                                           
14 More money invested in the market does not have to mean that there is more trading activity. The 
traders can let their money lie on cash accounts without being forced to trade at all. On the other hand, and 
  11Another variable positively influencing efficiency is the heterogeneity of traders. If all traders 
have the same believes, information and style of trading or if they influence each other (being 
for example from one class at the university), the market can operate with biases.  
Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) discuss the risk of false information in the market if traders 
largely bank on results from opinion polls that can be biased due to errors (discussion see 
above). There can be moreover some judgment bias of traders with regard to their personal 
experience with election and political parties (for example excessive sympathy for some 
party), preventing traders from “rational, fact-based” considerations and expectation. 
Last, but not least, the market should be constructed only on such an event which does not 
require excessive effort to find and analyze information. Parliamentary, presidential election 
or national referenda are suitable events to be predicted by experimental stock markets 
because of the ease to find almost all relevant information in the Internet where the trading 
also takes place. 
 
3. The 2002 Czech Election Market 
3.1 Market design 
The political stock market on Czech Parliamentary Elections into the Chamber of Deputies in 
June 2002 was organized by Merit Research, a non-profit research organization established in 
2001 in Prague.
15  The organizer was responsible for financial affairs and the official web-site 
of the project (http://www.merit-research.cz) in collaboration with colleagues from Charles 
University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies (IES FSV 
UK).
16 The market was technically operated by Dresden Electronic Markets at Dresden 
University of Technology.
17  
The market started on Monday, March 18, 2002 at 12 a.m., and closed on Wednesday, 
June  11, 2002, at 12 p.m. Contracts were issued on the following parties (alphabetically 
ordered): 
(a) CSSD - Czech Social Democratic Party, 
(b) KOAL - Coalition of KDU-CSL (Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak 
People’s Party) and US-DEU (Freedom Union – Democratic Union), 
(c) KSCM – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, 
(d) ODS – Civic Democratic Party, and 
(e) ROF – Rest of Field (parties with very small probability of getting some seats in the 
parliament).
18 
The contracts represented promises to pay liquidation values after the election based upon the 
fraction of all valid votes received by the party (coalition, Rest of Field) on which the contract 
was issued. Precisely, the liquidation value was determined by following expression: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
because of the positive effect of trading volume on predictive accuracy, the subsidy of initial investment is 
usually conditioned by certain trader’s activity, measured for example by a fraction of his trades with other 
traders on his initial investment (primary operations with unit portfolios are not accepted because they do not 
bring any new information into the market). 
15 See http://www.merit-research.cz. Merit Research was represented in the project by Adam Geršl. 
16 Tomáš Cahlík and Michal Hlaváček. 
17 For an overview on Dresden Electronic Markets activities see the Internet homepage of Dresden 
Electronic Markets under: http://www.tu-dresden.de/wwvwlgkw/DEM/Dresden%20Electronic%20Markets.htm.   
18 See the election server of the Czech Statistical Office, http://www.volby.cz, for political subjects 
registered for the election into the Chamber of Deputies in June 2002. There were 29 parties, movements and 
coalitions, thus ROF included 25 subjects. None of them reached the necessary limit of 5 % of votes in order to 
get seats in the Chamber. 
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where Ai denotes the liquidation value of contract i in CZK, si is the vote share (thus a number 
between 0 and 1) of the party i, and W is the price of unit portfolio. The price of unit 
portfolios was set to 1 CZK.  
Minimal initial investment was set to 10 CZK, maximal investment to 500 CZK. The upper 
limit of all initial investments was 50 000 CZK. Every trader got additional 10 percent of his 
initial investment on his cash account immediately after the cash transfer on condition that he 
then traded within the secondary market more than 20 percent of his initial investment. This 
condition was set to prevent traders from using the market as a favorable deposit. If a trader 
had not satisfied this condition, he got his portfolio liquidation value minus the subsidy 
provided by the organizer at the liquidation date.
19  
3.2 Market liquidation and traders’ payoffs 
The liquidation of the market and final payouts of traders were made on the first working day 
after election day (Monday, June 17). Table 1 shows the liquidation values of the contracts 
based on the results of the election that were announced one day before, on Sunday, June 16.
20 
Table 1: Liquidation values of contracts 
Contract  Vote share  Liquidation value 
CSSD  30.2 %  0.302 CZK 
KOAL  14.3 %  0.143 CZK 
KSCM  18.5 %  0.185 CZK 
ODS  24.5 %  0.245 CZK 
ROF  12.5 %  0.125 CZK 
Unit portfolio  100 %  1.000 CZK 
 
A total of 23 traders enrolled in the market; most of them were economics students at Faculty 
of Social Sciences of Charles University in Prague. As the number of traders is rather small 
when compared to other electronic markets (Berg et al. 2003), the results must be interpreted 
with caution. Average initial investment was 216 CZK. The highest rate of return (on initial 
investment plus the subsidy provided by the market organizer) was 19 percent and the highest 
loss was minus 17 percent.
21 However, almost all “unsuccessful” traders (with only one 
exception) realized a positive net gain, which means that losses from trading did not exceed 
the 10 percent subsidy from the market organizer.  
The average rate of return was 2.02 percent (median 0.28 percent), successful traders (13 
participants) realized an average profit of 7.28 percent (median 6.77 percent), unsuccessful 
                                                           
19 It must be mentioned that subsidizing traders is not a usual practice in electronic markets. We have 
decided for this option in order to motivate traders to participate, as this market was the first to be run on a Czech 
election ever.  
20 Final payouts to traders were rounded up to tenth of CZK. 
21 Under assumption that traders enrolled the market on the first day of its existence and traded the whole 
period of market duration (86 days), the highest annualized rate of return was 80.6 percent, the highest loss 72.2 
percent (year=365 days). Compare with the results referred in Forsythe et al. (1992, p. 1147), where the highest 
annualized rate of return was 65.8 percent and the highest annualized loss was 659.0 percent. Forsythe et al. 
(1992) used a little different formula for computing annualized rates, taking only the actual period of traders’ 
investment into consideration.  
  13traders (10 participants) incurred an average loss of minus 4.82 percent (median minus 3.27 
percent).  
One might expect that traders with higher initial investment should realize higher rates of 
return, because better informed and self-confident traders would invest more believing in their 
success and actively searching for profit opportunities. A second reason might be that getting 
relevant information incurs some fixed cost; thus traders with higher investments are more 
likely to cover the fixed cost in order to get better information and higher profit chances. 
Fosythe et al. (1992) found such a positive relationship between initial investment and 
realized profit by “marginal traders”. In our case, the relationship is not clear, as the results 
are statistically insignificant.
22  
Figure 1: Distribution of initial investments and final payoffs 
















The fact that there was no significant relationship between initial investments and realized 
profits also indicates that the market did not raise inequality of initial investment distribution. 
Figure 1 shows the overlapping Lorenz-curves for initial investments and final payoffs. The 
Gini-coefficient denoting inequality in distribution
23 even decreased somewhat from 0.390 
(initial investment distribution) to 0.379 (final payoffs). Thus, the participants’ decision about 
initial investments might not have been motivated by expectation of profits or necessity to 
invest some fix costs for obtaining relevant information, but by interest in the market as such. 
We can thus argue that participants with higher interest in this new “afternoon” activity 
invested more money than others. Another motive for higher investment could be the subsidy 
                                                           
22 The regression was in the following form: rate of return in %= 5.968 % (2.262) – 0.166 (-1,857) * 
initial investment, 
number in parentheses denoting t-statistics, R
2 was 0.376, F-statistics was 3.447 (0.077). 




















) 1 ( 2 , where n is the number of 
observation and xi is the value of observation i, thus G being between 0 (equal distribution) and 1 (total unequal 
distribution).  
  14provided by the market organizer. Thus, participants might have invested more money in 
order to get more subsidy, realized only necessary “20 percent trades” without directly aiming 
to gain profits by seeking and using relevant information and waited till the end of the game. 
However, we did not find any significant negative relationship between initial investment and 
market activity, on the contrary, traders with highest investment (400-500 CZK) traded on 
average more than other traders. The subsidy also played an eminent role in attracting 
potential traders to the game. The evidence thus tells us that the insignificant relationship 
between initial investment and realized profit has no single cause and was probably induced 
by the small number of participants, making every single unordinary behavior quite 
influential. 
3.3 Market Activity 
Figure 2 shows market activity measured by the number of contracts traded per day. After an 
initial period of high interest in trading in the last weeks of March, the activity decreased 
somewhat, an observation which has often been made in experimental forecasting markets. 




























































































traded contracts per day MA(10)
 
While one might suspect that the observed pattern might have to do with the beginning of the 
final examinations period at the university or a possible loss of interest in trading by some 
traders we suggest that the primary reason for the somewhat diminishing trading activity is 
that market participants’ expectations on the final election outcome somewhat converged.
24 
Thus, there were fewer possibilities to find profitable trading opportunities over the market 
period thereby leading to decreasing trading activity. 
Another reason might have been that traders had simply actively traded in the beginning 
in order to fulfill the condition of trades of at least 20% of initial investment in order to 
qualify for the subsidy. A question may arise whether such a condition, and hereby induced 
active trading, may have biased prices. We argue that if traders are rational, they will use all 
available information for trading in secondary markets to maximize profits even when 
conducting “necessary” trades of 20% of their initial investment. Thus, such a condition, 
despite its impact on market activity, should not have any negative influence on predictive 
accuracy of prices. 
                                                           
24  
  153.4 Market forecasts and their accuracy 
We will now turn to a presentation of the market forecast of the election outcome and an 
attempt at evaluating its accuracy. In figures 3-7 we show the markets forecasts (ExpMarket), 
the forecasts published by the polling agencies Taylor Nelson Sofres Factum (TNSF) and 
Stem/Mark (STEM), and the actual election results (Reality). It is easy to see that the political 
stock market was quite successful in predicting the vote shares for CSSD, KOAL and ROF. 
On the other hand, the forecast errors for ODS and KSCM turned out to be quite large. 
In the beginning of the market there was already information in favor of the election success 
of CSSD available (for example good macroeconomic data, expected and well-perceived 
changes of the party’s leader and administration). The market caught the rising preferences 
for CSSD quite well. There were also news that made the prospects of election success of the 
coalition worse (disintegration of former 4-party-coalition into a 3-party-coalition and finally 
a 2-party-coalition, inside problems in the “two-party” coalition), being absorbed by the 
market quite well by diminishing value of the contract KOAL.  
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On the other hand, there was no significant news with regards to ODS in March and April. 
The culmination of pre-election fight via telephone campaign in the end of Mai was not 
perceived well by the public and caused the decline of preferences for ODS. The market 
seems not to have absorbed this information which was quite heavily discussed in media. The 
unpredictable rise of vote share for KSCM can be considered as a kind of shock, because it 
was not by any way expected and there were no signs indicating such a rise in preferences for 
the direct successor of the “single party” of the communist period 1948-1989.  
The figures indicate some advantages of the political stock market method in comparison with 
polls which have been discussed above in more detail: the market provided every day 
predictions, the volatility thus being lower than in surveys. The market was also superior to 
polls in reflecting the shifts of expected vote shares among parties. While the polls by TNSF 
correctly reflected the decline in preferences for ODS resulting from its aggressive telephone 
campaign, the polls failed to predict correctly the direction of the change of preferences. 
A common way of evaluating the accuracy of the forecasting market’s predicitions is to 
compare the market forecast’s accuracy to the one of available polls on the basis of simple 
error measures. In order to do so we compare the final market forecast resulting from 
normalized market closing prices with the last polls published before the election.
25 There are 
various simple error measures which could be used to compare forecasts: 
(a) the average absolute prediction error (or mean absolute error, MAE), used for example 












where K is the number of contracts, respectively parties (including “Rest of Field”), vi is 
the actual vote share of the party i, and v is the vote share prediction for the party i.   i ˆ
A second possibility of measuring predictive accuracy is 
(b) the average squared error (or mean squared error, MSE), being computed as 
                                                           
25 The last traded prices must be normalized by dividing them by the sum of closing prices for all 
contracts in the market. This ensures that the normalized closing prices sum up to the value of a unit portfolio 
which corresponds to 100 percent of the relevant vote. Closing prices may not sum to one because of 
nonsynchronous trading, the bid-ask spread and possible arbitrage violations, see Berg et al. (1997, p. 452). 











The average squared error puts more weight on large forecast errors than the mean absolute 
error. However, the appropriate choice of an error measure in the end depends on the cost 
function of the forecaster. Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) argue that large forecast errors 
typically lead to highly inaccurate predictions of future governments or government 
coalitions. Thus, the mean squared error might be more useful to evaluate election forecasts. 
However, in table 2 we report both error measures for the market forecast and the last 
published polls of TNSF and STEM. Even though the market delivered quite inaccurate 
forecasts for ODS and KSCM the market performed better than the polls under both error 
measures. 
Table 2: Comparison of election forecasts’ accuracy 








CSSD  30.2 27.9  28.0  22.6 
ODS  24.5 30.9  24.0  23.7 
KOAL  14.3 15.0  16.0  16.1 
KSCM  18.5 13.9  12.0  14.3 
ROF  12.5 12.4  20.0  23.3 
MAE  - 2.8  3.7  5.0 
MSE  - 13.6  21.3  39.2 
 
In figure 8 we show the development of predictive accuracy of the market forecast and polls 







i i v v SAE
1
ˆ . 
Figure 8 shows that predictive quality of the polls of superior quality by TNSF was more 
volatile than the one of the market forecast. 
 
























  19Since the Czech Parliamentary Election Market was the first electronic forecasting market in 
the Czech Republic it is also interesting to compare the forecasting accuracy to markets 
conducted abroad. Berg et al. (1997) analyzed 16 vote share markets conducted by Iowa 
Electronic Markets in the U.S.; the average mean absolute error (MAE) of these markets 
range from 0.06 percent to 8.6 percent. Thus, in comparison with the U.S. markets the Czech 
Parliamentary Election Market performed quite well with a mean absolute error of 2.8 
percent. Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) survey 25 vote share markets conducted in Germany, 
thereby reporting average mean absolute errors in between 0.58 and 3.67 percent.  
Experimental markets generate time series of fixed event forecasts, i.e. forecasts of one and 
the same event at different points in time. Nordhaus (1987) proposed a concept of examining 
(weak) efficiency of fixed event forecasts via studying in how far the forecast revisions are 
auto-correlated. An efficient forecast should not allow for an enhancement of forecast quality 
via using information present in past (and thus observable) forecast revisions. We applied this 
test to the market forecasts of the vote shares generated by the market. The results are shown 
in table 3. 
Table 3: Test for weak efficiency of market forecasts 
Party share  coefficient  t-statistic  probability 
ODS  -0.44 -4.41 p<0.01 
CSSD  -0.18 -1.63 p>0.1 
KOAL  -0.27 -2.45 p<0.05 
KSCM  -0.03 -0.30 p>0.1 
ROF  -0.48 -4.75 p<0.01 
 
Only the revisions of the market forecasts of the CSSD and KSCM turned out to be serially 
uncorrelated. The remaining forecasts show a considerable degree of serial correlation 
indicating that new information was not always quickly incorporated into market prices.
26 
Altogether we conclude that the Czech Parliamentary Election Market of 2002 delivered 
results which are comparable to those in U.S. and German markets. In addition to that the 
Czech election market generated better forecasts than the polling agencies. These results are 
remarkable when taking into account that the forecasting market obviously suffered from 
some inefficiencies.  
 
4. Conclusions and outlook 
The results of the political stock market conducted on the Czech Election in June 2002 
indicate that the method is promising and problematic simultaneously. In order to generate 
highly accurate forecasts the market has to function efficiently. While the number of traders 
participating in electronic markets has yet not proved to be a significant factor of forecasting 
accuracy the comparatively low number of only 23 traders that took part in the project are on 
the lower limit of efficient market performance. Because of legal barriers preventing the 
participation of the large public in the market, only the students and staff of the university 
were entitled to trade in the market. This can lead to some serious biases, wish-fulfillments 
effects and further problems, preventing all relevant information to be reflected in the market 
prices. Thus, it might be necessary to open future markets for a wider audience. 
Experience gained by the pilot project in the Czech Republic will provide a basis for further 
research in this field of experimental economics. One possible direction of future research is 
                                                           
26 Another way of measuring predictive accuracy of experimental markets, also using auto-correlation, is 
presented in Berg, Nelson and Rietz (2003). See also Berg, Forsythe, Nelson and Rietz (2001) or Berg and Rietz 
(2003). 
  20to apply the method to the prediction of economic variables, as e.g. inflation. To provide 
inflation forecasts via electronic stock markets is not so easy as in the case of some political 
event because the inflation, though being very relevant for economists and public as well, is 
not so interesting for a wide audience like parliamentary or presidential election. 
First attempts to transfer the method to forecast macroeconomic variables have recently been 
made by Berlemann (2002) when conducting a prototype experimental inflation forecasting 
market. Differently from the political stock market, such forecasting markets are organized as 
so-called winner-takes-all markets. The contracts in these markets cover the range of all 
possible values the inflation rate might take.
27 The liquidation value of contracts then depend 
on the probability that the factual inflation rate falls into the intervals. 
There are some problems with such markets: Firstly, the more intervals we have, the more 
precise the forecast can be, but at the same time traders have to deal with more contracts, 
making the prediction more complicated. Secondly, inflation forecasts are relevant especially 
for inflation targeting central banks, but they need some forecasts of two- or three-year-ahead 
inflation. Since markets can not be liquidated before the event, the market is conducted on, 
has occurred, there is quite a long period of time between the beginning of the market period 
and liquidation of the market. However, first experiences with designing a regular forecasting 
system via electronic markets in Bulgaria show that the problems are at least partially 
manageable.
28 
Although experimental stock markets are often designed to generate predictions, there are of 
course other aims of conducting such markets. As we have noted in the introduction, the 
educational purpose for students participating in the market is relevant and useful as well. 
Another aim of such experiments is to investigate the use and distribution of information in 
markets and its reflection in prices, as pointed out by Beckmann et al. (1996), Smith (1982) or 
Sunder (1995), providing a fruitful experimental data for information economics. Last, but not 
least, the experimental markets can tell us more about the behavior of traders, their behavioral 












27 More precisely, he dealt with following 8 intervals into which the inflation rate can fall: (-∞, 0.0), <0.0, 
1.5), <1.5, 2.0), <2.0, 2.5>, <2.5, 3.0), <3.0, 3.5), <3.5, 4.0), <4.0, +∞). The determination of the intervals 
reflects of course some inflation expectation of the market designer, but it is further possible to split some 
contracts into two or more, if the current set does not seem to be appropriate.  
28 In a series of experiments in Bulgaria forecasting markets with horizons up to one year were already 
organized. 
29 See several articles in the Journal of Evolutionary Economics that emerged in 1991. 
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